Page 149 - Costellazioni 6
P. 149

GÜNTER RADDEN, Meaningful Grammar



                                 The  modal  expressions  listed  under  (7)  already  provide  the
                           speaker with a wealth of choices to frame their assessment either sub-
                           jectively or objectively. There are also virtually unlimited possibilities
                           of forming complex epistemic expressions. Halliday (1994) lists some
                           such epistemic expressions, all of which mean ‘I believe’:


                                 (10a) Everyone admits that…; All authorities on the subject
                                      are agreed that…; No one person would pretend that
                                 (10b) It stands to reason that…; Commonsense determines
                                      that…; It would be foolish to deny that…


                           The expressions under (10a) are generalizations. An assessment is, of
                           course, made and communicated by an individual person. Since the
                           speaker who makes the assessment is also included in the overall set,
                           the generalized expressions make perfect sense. These expressions can
                           be seen as instances of the conceptual metonymy GENERAL FOR SPECIFIC,
                           which accounts for the use of everyone for ‘I’
                                 The expressions under (10b) refer to reasoning. Their use also
                           makes sense because epistemic assessments are based on conclusions
                           arrived at by one’s reasoning. The usages are based on the metonymy
                           REASON FOR CONCLUSION, which accounts for it stands to reason for ‘I con-
                           clude’. All these expressions give an objective view of an assessment
                           and are, therefore, mainly found in formal and academic discourse.

                           3.2 Non-epistemic modalities
                           Non-epistemic modality is often referred to as root modality be-
                           cause it is historically and conceptually more basic than epistemic
                           modality. Root modality is difficult to define, mainly due to its dis-
                           parate subtypes. The following three subtypes of root modality can
                           be distinguished.


                                 (11a) Deontic modality
                                      Permission: You can go home now.
                                      Obligation: You must go home now.
                                 (11b) Intrinsic modality
                                      Intrinsic possibility: You can be charming.
                                      Intrinsic necessity: You must be careful.



                                                           147
   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154